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Programmes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are increasingly implemented in contexts of violent extremist conflict. In such settings, DDR practitioners may need to distinguish between ex-combatants who can be safely reintegrated into civilian life, and ex-combatants who are likely to present a danger to the community in terms of violent and/or extremist re-offending. To help practitioners make this assessment, this paper explores how risk assessment tools used by psychologists in criminal justice settings may be adapted to screen for violent extremist offenders in DDR programmes. The findings suggest that the method of structured professional judgment (SPJ) can be used to assess the risk that individual ex-combatants will re-offend upon return to civilian life. By extension, SPJ can also: (1) help practitioners to understand what type of deradicalization and disengagement programming former members of extremist groups may require and (2) contribute to decisions concerning the release of ex-combatants from prisons and transitional DDR centres.

This article investigates the link between the organizational structure of nonstate armed groups and the ability of low-level combatants to desert without recapture. Throughout, I show that nonstate armed groups can adopt organizational structures that mimic those found in national armies and that are designed both to detect wannabe deserters and to facilitate the denunciation and recapture of those who manage to escape. The odds of a successful desertion are increased when territorial safe havens beyond the reach of these organizational structures are available. Three types of territorial safe haven are identified: (1) territory composed of rough terrain and/or free of nonstate armed groups and their informants; (2) United Nations (UN) bases and cantonment sites; and (3) other state and nonstate armed groups willing to accept deserters. These arguments are inductively developed from interviews with more than one hundred former members of nonstate armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Although it is common for armed groups to splinter (or "fragment") during contexts of multi-party civil war, current guidance on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) does not address the challenges that arise when recalcitrant fighters, unwilling to report to DDR, break ranks and form new armed groups. This Practice Note addresses this issue, drawing lessons from the multi-party context of the DRC and from the experiences of former members of three armed groups: the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), and the DRC national army (FARDC). While the findings indicate that the fragmentation of armed groups may encourage desertion and subsequent participation in DDR, they also show that active armed groups may monitor DDR programs and track those who demobilize. Remobilization may follow, either as active armed groups target ex-combatants for forced re-recruitment or as ex-combatants remobilize in armed groups of their own choice. Given these dynamics, practitioners in settings of partial peace may find it useful to consider non-traditional methods of DDR such as the use of mobile patrols and mobile disarmament units. The temporary relocation of ex-combatants to safe areas free from armed groups, or to protected transitional assistance camps, may also help to minimize remobilization during the reintegration phase.

ABSTRACTWhy do non-state armed groups forcibly recruit civilians? To address this question I develop a conceptual framework distinguishing voluntary, coerced and forced recruitment. I then compare the recruitment tactics employed by 'Mai-Mai' militias and the RCD-Goma rebel group in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in order to inductively develop a theory explaining why groups with different initial economic and social endowments resort to force. This comparison draws on interviews with 41 former militia members and 11 former members of RCD-Goma. The theory suggests that forced recruitment is most likely to occur when non-state armed groups experience manpower deficits and when accountability (to local communities, government sponsors and/or the international community) is low. High levels of popular support will not necessarily prevent recourse to force under these conditions, but may mean that force is less necessary because voluntary and coerced recruits come forward to fill manpower gaps.

Controlling ovarian cancer: An introduction to detection and treatment
With current strategies proving inadequate, what needs to be done is to further the research into detecting, treating, and controlling ovarian cancer. Specifically, ovarian cancer develops when malignant ovarian cancer cells proliferate on the surface of the ovary and directly migrate/exfoliate to the peritoneal cavity where they attach to structures such as the omentum. Women at early stages of tumor growth on the omentum do not display specific symptoms and hence the tumors remain unnoticed until tumor growth is extensive. Because the ovarian tumor cells do not metastasize via the blood stream early detection of mutant cells in serum samples is not feasible with current methods. More sensitive assays and specific markers of ovarian cancer are needed.

Ovarian cancer research: Examining ovarian function and dysfunction
Ovarian cancer is largely a misnomer because the cells giving rise to malignant tissue are not derived from either follicular or luteal cells. Instead, ovarian cancer cells evolve from ovarian surface epithelial cells (OSEs) that cover the surface of the ovary and fallopian tube and separate these tissues from the abdominal peritoneal cavity. Unlike other cancers that metastasize through the vascular system, ovarian cancer cells detach from the ovarian surface, disseminate and grow in the peritoneal cavity. What are the causes of ovarian cancer? The answers to this question are complex. There is not just one, but many underlying factors. However, the most common cause that initiates cancer involves mutations in specific genes, such as tumor protein 53 (TP53), BRAC1/2, KRAS, PTEN, that lead to abnormal cell proliferation and evasion of cell death. Many of these genes are involved in DNA repair, essential for maintaining normal gene expression; others are involved in metabolic/ growth regulatory pathways.

The Greater Sahel region has never experienced such a high-level of arms availability. Given the large array of efforts now in place across the region to stem the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), it is pertinent to take stock, assess who is doing what, and reflect on opportunities to reduce programmatic duplication through enhanced co-ordination. This Working Paper is a first step in this regard and provides an overview of small arms control efforts in the Greater Sahel region for 2015 to 2016. The information presented is drawn from a practitioner survey and accompanying literature review, and outlines not only current small arms control projects in 12 countries but also current capacity shortfalls. Produced as part of a joint African Union-Germany project on enhanced SALW control, this Working Paper aims to serve as a continually updated reference document, which will eventually become a comprehensive repository of SALW projects in the Greater Sahel.

This Knowledge Note provides key insights from the BICC annual conference titled "Between concepts and reality: How to deal with armed groups in transition phases of violent conflict?". This conference, held in virtual format on 11 and 12 November 2021, explored whether there is a need for fresh thinking in engaging with (former) combatants. Around 100 international academics, policymakers and practitioners participated online. The key insights gained and discussed in this Knowledge Note are the following: 1) While DDR concepts are informed by situations on the ground, they are also shaped by the structures and mandates of international implementing organisations. 2) Although DDR has evolved over time, overall innovation is lacking. This is partially due to international organisations' risk aversion and their tendency to stick to the same approaches. 3) Despite the prevalence of lessons learned, many are not applied. 4) Research should play a more prominent role at different levels of DDR processes, in particular at the practical level, with targeted support for practitioners. Summarising each conference session and breakout group, this Knowledge Note explains why the above insights emerged as crucial. A video documentation of the conference is available on YouTube.